Trang chủDomestic FootballThree Candidates for the VFF Presidency: The 600-1,000 Billion Dong Money Flow and the Map of Votes

Three Candidates for the VFF Presidency: The 600-1,000 Billion Dong Money Flow and the Map of Votes

**Câu trả lời cốt lõi:** Liên đoàn Bóng đá Việt Nam (VFF) công bố ba ứng viên Chủ tịch nhiệm kỳ 10 (2027-2031): Trần Quốc Tuấn, Nguyễn Xuân Vũ và Nguyễn Đức Thụy. Ông Nguyễn Đức Thụy cam kết huy động 600-1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm từ năm 2027, không dùng ngân sách nhà nước, kèm gói hỗ trợ câu lạc bộ và định hướng mở rộng V-League lên 16-18 đội. **Sự kiện chính:** - Ba ứng viên Chủ tịch VFF: Trần Quốc Tuấn (đương nhiệm), Nguyễn Xuân Vũ (Phó Chủ tịch truyền thông), Nguyễn Đức Thụy (Phó Chủ tịch HĐQT Sacombank). - Mục tiêu huy động 600-1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm từ năm 2027 qua tài trợ, thương quyền, nội dung số và dịch vụ bóng đá. - Gói hỗ trợ dự kiến: 3 tỷ đồng mỗi CLB V-League, 2 tỷ đồng mỗi CLB hạng Nhất, 2 tỷ đồng mỗi CLB nữ mỗi mùa. - Định hướng mở rộng V-League lên 16-18 đội, hạng Nhất 18-20 đội, bóng đá nữ 8-10 đội. - Cam kết không sử dụng ngân sách nhà nước từ năm 2027; đề nghị điều chỉnh phân bổ khoảng 80 tỷ đồng mỗi năm hiện có. **Nguồn:** Liên đoàn Bóng đá Việt Nam (VFF), danh sách đề cử chức danh chủ chốt và Ủy viên Ban chấp hành nhiệm kỳ 10 (2027-2031), công bố năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan:** Q: Ai đang giữ ghế Chủ tịch VFF? A: Ông Trần Quốc Tuấn, người được đề cử tiếp tục cho nhiệm kỳ 10 (2027-2031). Q: Ứng viên Nguyễn Đức Thụy cam kết huy động bao nhiêu tiền cho bóng đá Việt Nam? A: 600-1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm kể từ năm 2027, theo chương trình hành động tranh cử công bố năm 2026. Q: V-League sẽ mở rộng lên bao nhiêu đội? A: Định hướng nghiên cứu phương án V-League 16-18 đội và hạng Nhất 18-20 đội, theo đề xuất của ứng viên Nguyễn Đức Thụy." } ```

On a Manchester morning, I opened the campaign programme of the candidate for the presidency of the Vietnam Football Federation and read it from the last page backwards. The habit comes from years spent in the corridors of the transfer market: the opening pages are always written in the language of ambition, while the appendix is where people admit what they actually intend to do with the money. On the final page of that programme sat a single, contract-like sentence: from 2027, mobilise 600-1,000 billion dong per year for Vietnamese football.

The nomination list published by the VFF puts three names forward for the presidency of the tenth term (2027-2031): Tran Quoc Tuan, the incumbent; Nguyen Xuan Vu, vice-president in charge of communications in term nine; and Nguyen Duc Thuy, deputy chairman of Sacombank's board and the man behind Ninh Binh FC. Three files, three ways of reading the same resource. Only one file offers numbers precise enough to be cross-checked line by line.

The VFF congress is a representative body, not a popular vote. Delegates come from provincial and municipal football federations, from professional clubs, from standing committees and from a number of institutional members. Because delegates are also the units that receive support, every budget line in a campaign programme lives two lives: the technical life of how much and for what, and the political life of who receives, who feels recognised, and who remembers.

I once sat in the stands in Changzhou for the 2026 AFC U-23 final, snow falling, watching a Vietnamese generation walk onto a big stage without fear. Eight years later, names from that generation such as Nguyen Quang Hai and Nguyen Tien Linh have passed their peak, while the logistics questions behind them remain on the table: training pitches, nutrition, medical care, matches per season, and the number of people paid to do the work nobody sees.

Term nine leaves a bipolar legacy. The national team produced memorable nights, the women's game held its regional standing, futsal advanced. But the layer underneath is thin: too few competitive matches for young players, a first division that struggles financially, clubs kept alive by a single local enterprise, and a refereeing pool so shallow that one injury or one suspension can tilt an entire round.

The 600-1,000 billion target is large relative to Vietnamese football. Based on figures the VFF has published at recent congresses, annual revenue sits in the low hundreds of billions, dominated by sponsorship, broadcast rights and competition operations. Doubling or tripling that within four years is the ambition of an organisation trying to change weight class — and if it misses, the rest of the programme collapses with it.

Now open the support schedule and add it up. Two to three billion dong per eligible provincial federation, multiplied by 63 provinces and cities, gives roughly 126-189 billion, say 157 billion at the midpoint. Three billion per V-League club across 14 clubs is 42 billion. Two billion per first-division club across just over ten clubs is 22-24 billion. Two billion per women's club across eight clubs is 16 billion. The total lands near 240-250 billion dong a year — roughly a quarter to forty percent of the fundraising target.

A quarter to forty percent of the money raised flows straight back as cash to the very units sitting in the congress hall. That is the core of the whole programme, and it is what most commentary misses when it argues only about whether 1,000 billion is big or small. The total says nothing about development. The allocation structure does.

The largest line is not money for professional clubs but money for provincial federations — the biggest and most stable bloc of delegates. Club money for the V-League comes second. Women's and first-division money follow. That ordering maps almost perfectly onto the ordering of political influence inside a VFF congress.

The programme does not stop at handing out money; it expands the leagues, and league size increases the payment obligation. A 16-team V-League lifts club support from 42 to 48 billion; 18 teams lifts it to 54 billion. An 18-20 team first division lifts that line from about 22 billion to 36-40 billion. Total annual obligations could pass 280 billion. League size and budget size are locked together: to expand the league you need money, and to have money you need to expand the league.

The most sophisticated passage sits elsewhere: a commitment that from 2027, one hundred percent of the VFF's operating and development funding will come from socialised and self-generated revenue, with no state budget — alongside a proposal to work with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and the sports authority to reallocate the roughly 80 billion dong granted annually for football tasks towards sports with medal potential at the Asian Games and Olympics.

Read together, those two sentences are a sharp political move. The candidate does not ask for more state money; he hands back 80 billion and redirects it. In return the federation gains what state money can never buy: discretion over spending without an approval chain. The price deserves to be stated plainly. State money arrives with state audit and public budget oversight. When the money leaves the budget, those mechanisms leave with it. The clause on publicity, transparency, auditing and member supervision therefore stops being decorative — it becomes the entire braking system of the organisation, and that braking system is operated by the people receiving the support.

League expansion should be read in matches, not clubs. Fourteen teams in a double round robin means 26 rounds and 182 matches. Sixteen teams means 30 rounds and 240 matches. Eighteen teams means 34 rounds and 306 matches — eight extra competitive games per club per season. For a 20-year-old that is eight more chances to be seen; for a team doctor, eight more load calculations; for a coach, eight more fixtures inside the same calendar.

Vietnam carries a constraint European leagues do not: the central coast rainy season, southern heat, and an ever-denser FIFA calendar, plus AFC competitions, Asian Cup qualifiers, SEA Games and the AFF Cup. A 34-round league squeezed into that space is a scheduling problem, not a slogan. Then comes the gate few mention: club licensing. To play in the V-League a club must meet standards on stadium, floodlights, pitch quality, youth academy, medical staffing and — most importantly — audited accounts with no overdue payables. Expanding the first division to 18-20 teams means finding six to eight more compliant entities. If they cannot be found, standards will be lowered, and lowering standards is the fastest way for a league to dilute its own commercial value.

On the women's game, the target of 8-10 stable teams is modest in number and ambitious in structure, since V-League clubs are encouraged to establish, link with or sponsor women's sides. The model borrows existing infrastructure — pitches, medical rooms, kitchens, media staff — instead of making the women's game build from zero. Its weakness is equally familiar: the women's team becomes a dependent department of the men's club, and when the men's club hits financial trouble, the women's team is the first line cut. Players such as Huynh Nhu have proven the value of Vietnamese women's football on their own path, but a league cannot live on a handful of exceptional individuals.

On refereeing, the plan to invest deeply in 10-20 promising referees and assistant referees is small in money and large in effect. From years of watching matches across leagues, I would argue refereeing quality quietly determines a competition's commercial value: with good officials, players dare to hold the ball, dare to contest, dare to play the kind of football that needs time.

The international target — at least 5-10 Vietnamese staff employed, appointed or regularly assigned at AFF, AFC and FIFA by 2030 — is the right direction and the hardest item on the list. Committee seats do not come from sponsorship money. They come from relationships, from turning up to meetings year after year, from taking on the small jobs nobody wants. A seat on an AFC technical committee means a voice in draws, scheduling and slot allocation. The quietest line may be the most valuable: training at least 20 staff in foreign languages, governance and operations from 2027. Twenty people is a small number costing a few billion dong, and it is precisely the investment Vietnamese football has skipped for two decades. Investments in people are routinely undervalued in a campaign programme because they produce nothing to photograph.

And now the part a campaign programme never discusses about itself. Nguyen Duc Thuy owns Ninh Binh FC. His programme proposes three billion dong per season for every V-League club. Nothing here is unlawful, and nothing here justifies imputing motive. But it raises a concrete governance question delegates should ask before voting: is that support calculated by a formula published in advance, or decided case by case? The difference between those two methods is the entire difference between a policy and a patronage mechanism.

The audit commitment also deserves slow reading. An internal audit commissioned by the federation, with scope set by the federation, is not an audit in the sense the public understands. An independent audit, by a firm outside the influence of board members, with full financial statements published annually, is what creates real pressure. An organisation taking 600-1,000 billion dong a year from companies and supporters should publish accounts the way a listed club publishes quarterly results — not because it is forced to, but because that is the only way to hold trust across terms.

One more blind spot, shared by all three files. Vietnamese football has had periods when more money entered than the system could absorb. Money reached clubs, clubs raised wages, players' lives changed, and three years later the club dissolved. Money is not the binding constraint. The binding constraints are the number of quality matches a 19-year-old plays each year, the number of professionally licensed coaches, the number of qualified sports doctors, the number of competent referees. More money without movement on those four raises prices, not capability.

All three candidates will promise broadly similar things about money, because nobody campaigns on cutting budgets. Tran Quoc Tuan holds the advantage of incumbency and familiarity. Nguyen Xuan Vu holds the communications channel and press relationships that shape a federation's image. Nguyen Duc Thuy holds a business record and a programme with numbers. What separates them is not the total. It is the shape of the tenth-term executive committee: who sits on finance, who checks the spending, and whether the allocation formula is published before the congress.

Signatures on a resolution dry quickly, but the story of a term lives on in phone calls. I belong to no camp in this election; I belong to the dark space between three campaign programmes, where identical numbers are written with different intentions. The two a.m. calls of the transfer world never discuss money; they always discuss power. At federation level that power has a more concrete shape: the right to decide who receives, how much, and for how long.

The next domino falls in one of two places. If delegates obtain the allocation formula before voting, Vietnamese football gets a term in which every payment can be traced, and the 600-1,000 billion target becomes a measurable commitment rather than a slogan. If nobody asks, term ten begins with an allocation table written after the ballots are counted, and every promise of transparency reduces to the opening line of a document.

By 2031, if the V-League has 18 teams, each player will play eight more matches a season. That sounds small. Multiply it by 400 professional players across four seasons and it becomes more than twelve thousand individual match experiences — twelve thousand times a young player learns to carry pressure in a real game before a real crowd. Football does not grow in meeting rooms. It grows on afternoons like those. The job of the people in the meeting rooms is to make sure those afternoons happen on schedule, with the right people, and in the right number.