Trang chủInternational FootballMessi Buys Eldense: The Rivalry with Ronaldo Leaves the Pitch

Messi Buys Eldense: The Rivalry with Ronaldo Leaves the Pitch

Core answer: Lionel Messi mua CD Eldense từ Grupo TH; thương vụ chờ CSD phê duyệt. Messi cũng sở hữu Cornella ở tầng thứ năm. Cristiano Ronaldo nắm 25% Almeria từ tháng 2/2026. Cả hai CLB cùng Segunda mùa 2026-27, đặt ra câu hỏi về Điều 67-68 Luật Thể thao Tây Ban Nha. Key facts: - Messi mua Eldense từ Grupo TH; giá và tỷ lệ cổ phần không công bố. - Ronaldo nắm 25% Almeria qua CR7 Sports Investments từ tháng 2/2026. - CSD phê duyệt là điều kiện tiên quyết; Điều 68 cấm sở hữu hai CLB cùng giải. - Eldense và Cornella khác tầng, nên Điều 68 chưa kích hoạt. - Trận mở màn: Almeria 3-0 Eldense, bàn thắng của Bonini, Dzodic, Melamed. Source attribution: ESPN, AS (biên soạn bởi Hồng Duy), ngày 1 tháng 10 (năm không nêu). | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Related Q&A: Q: Messi sở hữu bao nhiêu phần trăm Eldense? A: Không được công bố; nếu từ 25% trở lên cần CSD phê duyệt trước. Q: Điều 68 có áp dụng không? A: Chưa, vì Eldense và Cornella khác tầng, nhưng có thể kích hoạt nếu Cornella thăng hạng. Q: Ronaldo sở hữu CLB nào? A: 25% Almeria qua CR7 Sports Investments từ tháng 2/2026.

On the night of October 1, I sat in my small apartment in Paris, replaying the clip of Almeria hosting Eldense. Three goals, nothing tactically worth reviewing. Federico Bonini, Stefan Dzodic, Nico Melamed scored. The scoreline read 3-0. The Nuevo Pepico Amat holds only 5,776 seats, and I wondered how many of those present realised they were witnessing one of the strangest club-ownership deals in Spanish football history. I watched 57 PSG matches during the four-month freeze to learn how to read football through space. This time, the space was not on the pitch. It was in legal filings, in undisclosed numbers, in an article of law called Article 68. Lionel Messi is buying CD Eldense. Cristiano Ronaldo has held 25% of Almeria since February 2026. Both clubs play in the Segunda División in the 2026-27 season. The media calls it "Messi vs Ronaldo, Round 2." But when I read the official announcement from Eldense, corroborated by ESPN and AS, I saw a different story: a club acquisition full of questions about governance, law, and the multi-club ownership model spreading across Europe. My tactical map was drawn from a France-Argentina night, where two shirts merged into one intent. But this map has no formation diagram. It has an ownership diagram. Who is CD Eldense? A club so small that even Spanish fans have to look it up. The Nuevo Pepico Amat holds 5,776 seats, among the smallest in Spain's professional system. The club first returned to Segunda in 2026 after nearly six decades, was relegated in 2026, and immediately promoted again. That is the portrait of a yo-yo club — up and down like a shuttle, surviving on broadcast money and small change. Almeria is different. A club that has played in La Liga, with a longer history, and since February 2026, Cristiano Ronaldo has held 25% through CR7 Sports Investments. The 25% figure is not arbitrary. Under Spanish Sports Law, Article 67, an investment becomes a "significant shareholding" at 5% or more of voting rights. And at 25% or more, the transaction requires prior CSD approval. Ronaldo has walked through that door. Messi has not. Article 68 is the more interesting part. It prohibits the same person or entity from holding significant shares or effective control in two clubs in the same professional league. The purpose: to protect competitive integrity. But Messi is not only buying Eldense. He is also buying Cornella, a club in the fifth tier of Spanish football. Two clubs, two different tiers. Legally, Article 68 is not triggered. Structurally, it is a time bomb. What type of deal is this? In essence, it is a club acquisition, not a player transfer. The seller is Grupo TH, a Colombian investment group. The buyer is Lionel Messi, an individual. But behind the name Messi lies an entire commercial ecosystem: brand, investment funds, partner networks. This deal is not done in simple cash, but through a multi-layered ownership structure. I have no purchase price. No stake size. No investment commitment. Only a "long-term project" line from the official announcement. In M&A language, that is a soft, non-binding signal. Transfers are where people buy players, while coaching staffs buy time. Here, someone is buying a club, and the question is what for. The multi-club ownership (MCO) model is no longer unfamiliar. City Football Group has dozens of clubs. Red Bull has Leipzig, Salzburg, New York, Bragantino. John Textor's Eagle Football has Lyon, Botafogo, Crystal Palace. These models operate on a "flagship + feeder" logic: one big club at the centre, smaller clubs as satellites supplying players, markets and data. Messi with Eldense and Cornella may be building a miniature version of that model — a "mini-MCO" based on personal brand rather than a corporation. But there is a difference. Traditional MCOs buy clubs to optimise finances and sporting performance. Why is Messi buying a club? The answer may lie in brand value. A Segunda club with 5,776 seats does not generate significant cash flow. But it generates media presence. For Messi, a small club in Spain is a platform to maintain influence after retirement, and a strategic asset in his investment portfolio. I have tracked 57 PSG matches to learn how to read space. Here, the biggest space is information. No financial statements, no shareholder structure, no investment plan. Any conclusion about the deal's financial sustainability must be held at low confidence. Let us start with what we know. Eldense has a 5,776-seat stadium. Matchday revenue is structurally limited. The club has just been promoted and relegated, its finances precarious. Segunda broadcast revenue is far lower than La Liga's. That is the financial picture of a small club. Messi can improve commercial revenue: shirts, sponsorship, ticket sales, social media followers. This is the core rationale of celebrity ownership. But the announcement states no specific financial commitment. No pledged investment, no capital injection, no stadium plan. Only a "long-term project." In financial analysis, opacity is the dominant feature. No purchase price, no stake size, no debt. Any conclusion about financial stability must be held at low confidence. This is not excessive caution. It is a principle: no data, no conclusion. One notable point: Grupo TH, a Colombian group, is selling. That is an exit. But an exit for profit or for distress? The source does not clarify. If it is a distress sale, the Messi deal may be a rescue. If it is a profit-taking exit, the club's valuation has risen. Both scenarios carry different meanings. This is the core of the story. Spanish Sports Law, Articles 67 and 68, set the legal framework for club ownership. Article 67: An investment becomes a "significant shareholding" at 5% or more of voting rights in a professional club. All such transactions must be notified to the CSD. The CSD may request details of the ownership structure. At 25% or more of voting rights: prior CSD approval is required. Unauthorised transactions do not take effect. Article 68: Prohibits the same person or entity from holding significant shares or effective control in two clubs in the same professional league. UEFA: Clubs with ownership links must prove no common control or decisive influence when both compete in the same UEFA competition. Here, Eldense and Cornella are at different tiers. Article 68 is not triggered. But if Cornella is promoted into the professional system, and if the two clubs ever play in the same league, Messi could be forced to divest, reduce his stake, or relinquish control at one of them. That is a structural risk, a time-bomb type. The CSD is the pivotal gatekeeper. The Eldense deal depends on CSD approval. This is a condition precedent, not a formality. If the CSD does not approve, the deal does not happen. If the CSD approves with conditions, the ownership structure may have to be adjusted. One important detail: the stake Messi is acquiring in Eldense is undisclosed. If it is 25% or more, prior approval is required. If it is below 5%, no notification is required. The regulatory burden depends on an undisclosed figure. That is the biggest legal blind spot. Segunda División is Spain's second tier. It is a harsh league, financially precarious, highly competitive. Clubs routinely sell players to balance the books. A small club like Eldense survives on broadcast money, sponsorship and player sales. Almeria, with Ronaldo's stake, is seen as a promotion contender. Eldense, with Messi, is expected to survive. The resource gap is clear. The opening 3-0 win for Almeria reflected that gap, at least in one match. But here is the key point: ownership does not change results on the pitch. Messi does not play. Ronaldo does not play. They do not take the field, score goals, or defend. Their impact is behind the scenes: finance, commercial, recruitment, strategy. In the short term, a Segunda club with a famous owner is still a Segunda club. I wrote about Morocco 2026, about their "moving wall." Here, the wall is not on the pitch. It is in the ownership structure. And it can move with the season. There is a large gap between fan expectation and club reality. When Messi buys Eldense, fans may dream of La Liga. The media may speak of a "new era." But the reality: Eldense is a survival club. The realistic target is Segunda survival, not promotion. This gap creates pressure. If results do not go well, pressure falls on the coaching staff, players and owner. This is the media risk of the celebrity ownership model. I have seen this at PSG. 57 matches. Grand expectations, spaces left unfilled. In Paris, the pressure is invisible but present. At Eldense, the pressure will be different: smaller in scale, but more focused on one individual. The story the media tells is "Messi vs Ronaldo." But that is the wrong way to tell it. The real contest is not between two players. It is between two ownership structures, two governance models, two approaches to the market. First blind spot: time. The report on the deal was published on October 1, but the year is not stated. Meanwhile, the article mentions Ronaldo joining Almeria in February 2026 and the 2026-27 season. This is a temporal anomaly that must be verified. If the year is 2026, the deal may be completed or near completion. If the year is another, this may be prospective or hypothetical content. Any conclusion based on this article must first be verified for timing. Second blind spot: ownership does not equal sporting success. Many celebrity owners have failed to convert brand into results on the pitch. Football is a complex system where money and fame do not guarantee victory. Third blind spot: legal risk is underestimated. The media focuses on entertainment, while Article 68 and the CSD's role may shape the deal's future. If Cornella is promoted, if the CSD imposes conditions, if UEFA intervenes, the story changes completely. Fourth blind spot: Messi's practical impact as owner may be far smaller than imagined. He will not run day-to-day operations. He will appoint, delegate, and appear on key occasions. Direct sporting impact may be very limited. The question is not whether Messi or Ronaldo will win. The question is whether the multi-club ownership model can operate within Spain's legal framework without breaking competitive integrity. The answer will come from the CSD, from Cornella, and from the pitch itself — where the numbers are not in legal filings, but in the back of the net. I will follow the return leg between Eldense and Almeria at Nuevo Pepico Amat. Not to see who wins. But to see whether a 5,776-seat club can contain a global power struggle.