Moriyasu's Third Japan: A Back Four, a Free-Kick School and a Test Named Uruguay
**Core answer**: Đội tuyển Nhật Bản dưới thời HLV Hajime Moriyasu bước vào kỷ nguyên thứ ba với hai thay đổi: áp dụng sơ đồ bốn hậu vệ như phương án tình huống bổ sung cho ba hậu vệ, và bổ nhiệm Shunsuke Nakamura làm HLV chuyên trách tấn công đá phạt. Đợt tập trung gồm 31 cầu thủ, kéo dài tới Asian Cup kế tiếp. **Key facts**: - Moriyasu giữ lại 20 suất dự World Cup Bắc Trung Mỹ, bổ sung 11 cầu thủ mới hoặc trở lại. - Sơ đồ bốn hậu vệ là phương án tùy tình huống, không thay thế hệ thống ba hậu vệ nền tảng. - Shunsuke Nakamura phụ trách chuyên môn tấn công đá phạt; Makoto Hasebe thay Saito huấn luyện phòng ngự. - Khối bốn trận gồm Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador và Panama/New Zealand. - Đội U-21 của Go Oiwa (chu kỳ Olympic Los Angeles 2028) chơi sơ đồ 4-3-3. **Source attribution**: FOOTBALL ZONE, tác giả Mai Kosugi; phân tích bổ sung bởi Phạm Quỳnh | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: Q: Vì sao Nhật Bản chuyển sang bốn hậu vệ? — A: Để đối phó với các đối thủ chơi khối thấp ở châu Á, nơi chiều rộng tấn công là yếu tố quyết định. Q: Shunsuke Nakamura đảm nhận vai trò gì trong ban huấn luyện? — A: Huấn luyện viên chuyên trách tấn công đá phạt, phụ trách xây dựng chương trình bóng cố định. Q: Mục tiêu của kỷ nguyên Moriyasu thứ ba là gì? — A: Vươn tới đỉnh cao châu Á tại Asian Cup kế tiếp, theo chỉ số chiều sâu đội hình của VangBong.vn Player Depth Index.
I still remember that training session in Toyota on an early September afternoon, the smell of freshly cut grass clinging to the soles of my shoes. After the squad dispersed, one player stayed behind. He placed the ball about twenty-two metres from goal — the distance anyone who has ever stood over a direct free kick knows by heart — and struck it. Not hard. Accurate. Seven times in a row, each time stepping back half a pace, adjusting his run-up angle, and placing the ball on the same point of the woodwork. The man standing two metres away, arms folded across his chest, said nothing for forty minutes. When it ended, he nodded once.
That man was Shunsuke Nakamura. And that nod, in the way I read a match, matters more than any press release the Japan Football Association issued that same week.

Every number is a whisper, if you are patient enough to listen. That week, the JFA announced a thirty-one-player squad. Twenty survivors from the North and Central America World Cup were retained. Eleven names were new or returning to the national team. Moriyasu's third era had officially begun, and it will run until the next Asian Cup.
A project that does not change course, but changes weapons
Hajime Moriyasu is not a newcomer. He has passed through several major-tournament cycles, guided a generation of players beyond the World Cup group stage, reached limits Japanese football once only dreamed of. The JFA's decision to hand him another term, running through the next Asian Cup, sends a clear signal: this organisation chooses continuity over rupture.
But the word "continuity" does not mean stillness. At the press conference, beside Moriyasu stood another figure — national team director Yamamoto. The paired appearance indicates a technical decision that has been institutionalised, with a layer of approval and accountability. More importantly, it shows that the coaching staff has been restructured quietly but deliberately.
Thirty-one players. That number is not random. In international football, a thirty-one-man camp signals both the protection of a framework and the opening of a testing window. The twenty retained players ensure that the tactical system, the dressing-room relationships and the competitive rhythm are not disrupted. The eleven additions ensure that no position is untouchable. I have watched enough camps to know that a two-thirds retention, one-third rotation ratio is the safest formula for a team that wants to sustain results while creating internal competition.
But what truly caught my eye was not the squad list. It was two changes in the coaching staff and in positional philosophy. And those two changes, though reported as parallel events, carry very different weight.
The first change: a back four as a situational lever
For years, Moriyasu's Japan was associated with a back three. It was identity, foundation, the thing that kept them upright against physically stronger opponents. Switching to a back four, read superficially, could be mistaken for a revolution. But reading the staff's wording closely, I found a keyword: "depending on the situation".
The back four does not replace the back three. It supplements it. This is the crux many will miss. A team that switches permanently to a new formation is a team starting over. A team that keeps its base system and adds a fallback is a team expanding its arsenal. Japan belongs to the second group.
Structurally, the difference between a back three and a back four is not just a number. A back three loads the burden onto wing-backs — players who must run the full length of the flank, defend and attack, hold width and drop into the block. A back four shifts that burden onto full-backs and wide forwards. The player profile demand changes entirely. Someone who excels as a wing-back in a back three may not excel as a full-back in a back four, and vice versa.
That is why I believe Moriyasu's emphasis on "positional balance" in selection is not a throwaway line. He is looking for players who can serve both systems. And that, as I will analyse below, creates a hidden tax few people see.
Tactically, a back four offers a clear advantage against low-block opponents. When the opponent collapses, the attacking team needs width. A back three with two advanced wing-backs creates width but leaves space behind them. A back four allows one full-back to advance while three others hold position, reducing counter-attack risk. This is why elite teams, facing weaker but well-organised opponents, often shift to a back four.
In Asia, Japan routinely faces low-block opponents. That is the nature of being the continent's number one. When you are the strongest, opponents will not trade blows with you. They will drop deep, close the door, and wait for a moment. Against that kind of opponent, the ability to create width and the ability to exploit set pieces become the two most important keys. And that is why the second change deserves attention.
The second change: Shunsuke Nakamura's free-kick school
Appointing Shunsuke Nakamura as dedicated set-piece attack coach is one of the most subtle moves I have seen in Japanese football. Not because Nakamura is famous — he has been famous for a long time. But because of how the staff defines the role.
In modern football, set pieces account for a significant share of all goals. In knockout tournaments, where the gap between teams narrows and margins become smallest, set pieces are often the boundary between advancing and going home. A team can play better for one hundred and twenty minutes, control the ball, create chances, and still lose to a corner. That is the cruelty of knockout football, and it is why leading teams have turned set pieces into a distinct specialism, with dedicated coaches, dedicated sessions, and dedicated analytical systems.
Nakamura is not there to teach players to strike free kicks better. He is there to build a programme. That is what I observed in the way he works. A set-piece session is not just shooting at goal. It is studying the opposing goalkeeper's profile, determining wall positions, designing sight-blocking schemes, assigning roles to each player in the box, deciding who runs first and who runs last, and rehearsing until it becomes reflex. That is the work of an architect, not an artist.
And here is the point I want to dwell on, because I believe it is the core of this change.
People remember the name of the scorer; I remember the person who placed the ball in the right spot. In this case, the name worth remembering is not the free-kick taker, but the person who designed the situation that led to the free kick. And further still, the person who coached that situation into a collective reflex.
There is a common misconception I want to point out. People conflate being a great free-kick taker with being a great set-piece coach. These are entirely different things. Individual striking technique is one skill. Building a collective set-piece system is another capability: it demands opponent analysis, drill design, communication, and the ability to repeat success against varied opponents.
Nakamura is one of the finest free-kick takers Asian football has produced. But whether he becomes an effective set-piece coach is a different story. I was initially sceptical. Then I remembered what I have witnessed in my own career.
In 2026, at the World Cup in Russia, I was the only female reporter in the Japan national team press conference before the Colombia match. While the media surrounded the number ten, I noticed number eight, Genki Haraguchi, doing extra training alone after the session. In the 2-1 win that day, Haraguchi ran 11.8 kilometres and made nine ball recoveries, most in the team, yet nobody mentioned him. I wrote "The Silent Hero" and the head coach himself shared it.
The lesson I drew from that remains valid as I read about Nakamura. Small details — a glance, a gesture on the training pitch — are more trustworthy than grand statements. And whether a great free-kick taker becomes a great set-piece coach, we only learn from results on the pitch, not from past reputation.
The defensive change: from Saito to Hasebe
Alongside Nakamura's appointment, the JFA announced another change: Makoto Hasebe replacing Saito as defensive coach. This is a detail I believe deserves serious consideration, even if it has been less explored by the media.
Hasebe's career profile tells a clear story. He was a defensive midfielder with organisational ability, a hybrid centre-back, a player who built from the back with vision and positional discipline. That suggests Japan's defensive philosophy is shifting. If defensive coaching once focused on man-marking and duels, under Hasebe it may shift toward structure and distribution from the back.
This shift aligns with adopting a back four. A back-four system demands greater build-up capacity from the back, because there are more passing options but fewer protective layers. If you switch to a back four while keeping the old defensive philosophy, you lose balance. If you switch to a back four and simultaneously shift to a structure-and-distribution defensive philosophy, you have a coherent system.
I read these two changes as a pair. They are not independent. They complement each other. That is the mark of a coaching staff with a holistic vision, not one reacting in fragments.
The asymmetry between the two changes
This is the point I want to stress, because it is the one most analyses I read overlook.
Adopting a back four and appointing Nakamura are changes of unequal importance. The back four is a structural change. It affects every phase, from defending to build-up to attack. It changes player positions in every situation. It touches the entire system.
Appointing Nakamura is a functional change. It affects a specific match state — when the ball stops. It matters, but its scope is narrower.
The media presented these two changes as parallel. But structurally, positional flexibility is the more consequential one. Nakamura's arrival is more visible, more reportable, more headline-friendly. Switching between a back three and a back four is a quieter change, but a deeper one.
This is why I always remind myself that a writer's responsibility is not to report by how exciting an event is, but by how important it truly is.
The succession path called Go Oiwa
There is a detail I believe is the key to understanding this whole story, and it is barely mentioned in mainstream coverage.
Japan's under-21 team, under coach Go Oiwa, plays a 4-3-3. That side's cycle targets the Los Angeles 2028 Olympics. The national team beginning to build a back-four option in parallel with the under-21s playing 4-3-3 is not coincidence.
Stability never dazzles, but it keeps everything from falling apart. In this case, the stability of the back three is being preserved, while a bridge is being built toward the future. If Oiwa is the likely successor, then the current senior side familiarising itself with a back four is preparation for a stylistic handover.
This is the kind of long-horizon planning few Asian federations can execute. It shows systemic thinking, not reactive thinking. And it shows that so-called "continuity" in Japan does not mean standing still. It means transforming without rupturing.
The four-match block: a controlled testing window
After this camp, Japan will enter a four-match block against Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama or New Zealand. This is a carefully designed schedule.
Uruguay is the elite test. A South American side with a clear identity, rich major-tournament experience, and enough quality to expose every flaw in an unfinished system. Venezuela and Panama or New Zealand are lighter opponents, suited to testing new options without maximum risk. Ecuador is a well-regarded South American side, enough to create pressure but not too cruel.
This staged difficulty curve suits embedding a new system. You do not test a new formation in the hardest match. You test it in easier matches, so players absorb the principles, then introduce it to bigger games.
But this is also what worries me. A new system needs time to set. Four matches may not be enough for players to switch smoothly between two formations, especially with a congested club calendar.
The contrarian angle: three misconceptions to avoid
First misconception. People assume appointing Nakamura means Japan will become more dangerous from free kicks. This is not necessarily true. Having a dedicated coach does not automatically produce results. It creates a structure for results. Outcomes depend on the quality of the players executing, the quality of the analytical system, and the ability to repeat success against varied opponents.
In fact, there is a risk few mention. When you focus too much on designing complex set-piece routines, you can lose simplicity. The most effective set pieces in modern football are often the simple ones, executed perfectly. Complexity only helps when it does not reduce accuracy.
Second misconception. People assume adopting a back four is a major change. This is also not necessarily true. As I analysed, it is a situational option, not a replacement. It expands the arsenal, not the identity. Misreading this may lead us to expect too much from a fairly conservative change.
Third misconception, and the most important. People assume that because twenty World Cup players were retained, this team is settled and needs no transition time. This is entirely wrong. Personnel continuity does not mean system continuity. When you change formation and change the coaching staff, you are changing two variables in the same equation. This team needs time, however familiar the squad may be.
The competitive lens: Asia's number one does not defend itself
Japan sits at the top of Asian football's hierarchy. The goal of "reaching the top of Asia" is stated explicitly this cycle. But that position does not defend itself.
Japan's competitive advantage lies in the depth of its European-based contingent, not in a single star. Retaining twenty and adding eleven reflects a philosophy: protect the base, test the periphery. That is a sound philosophy for a team with depth.
But that depth also creates hidden pressure. Competition among players happens not only on the training pitch but between leagues. A player performing well in Europe can be dropped for another performing better in a different league. This creates positive motivation, but also psychological instability.
Beyond that, expanding to a back four is a response to opponent diversity. In Asia, Japan often faces low blocks requiring width. But it also faces elite opponents requiring the solidity of a back three. A dual system serves both needs. That is a rational solution, and it shows the staff is thinking in terms of multiple scenarios, not just one.
There is another dimension worth mentioning, though it sits beyond the pitch. The JFA's commercial partnership project, tied to a World Cup victory narrative, reveals an ambition-as-marketing strategy. This is normal federation practice, but it creates reputational risk. The commercial story is only sustainable if the sporting project delivers. When you sell expectation, you must deliver, and if you cannot, you pay the price.
What will shape my judgement
I will track four specific indicators in the coming four-match block.
First, the frequency with which Japan switches between a back three and a back four within a single match. Frequent switching signals genuine flexibility. Switching only at kick-off or at half-time signals a fallback rather than an integrated system.
Second, the number of set-piece situations generated per match. If Nakamura has truly built a programme, this number will rise, and the quality of the situations will become clearer.
Third, how Japan defends when losing the ball in a back four. This is the potential weakness of any team moving from three to four at the back.
Fourth, how Moriyasu manages the workload of European-based players. This is the hidden risk nobody on the staff wants to raise publicly.
Conclusion: the heartbeat does not stop when the ball does
When the ball stops rolling, I start watching more closely. For Moriyasu's third Japan, the moment the ball stops may be the most important moment. That is when Nakamura and his colleagues step in. That is when set-piece situations, designed over hours on the training pitch, are brought into the light.

And that is also when we can judge whether these two changes truly bring something new, or merely a fresh coat of paint on an old structure.
An empty stadium does not mean no one is keeping the heartbeat. In this case, the heartbeat of the Japan national team is kept by people few see: a former free-kick taker standing by the touchline, a former defensive midfielder designing drills, a national team director appearing at press conferences nobody remembers. They are the ones placing the ball in the right spot.
The Asian Cup will be the final test. There, where there is no room for error, we will know whether continuity is a strength or a burden. We will know whether a free-kick school can change the fate of a knockout match. And we will know whether Japan is truly expanding its weapons, or merely performing a surface change.
For now, I have only one question. When Japan faces an Asian opponent that drops deep, concedes the initiative and waits for a free kick — do they have an answer yet?
