Al-Fateh Calls Jamal Sellami: One Step, and a File Nobody Wants to Open
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi** Jamal Sellami, 55 tuổi, huấn luyện viên người Morocco, chỉ còn một bước để dẫn dắt Al-Fateh tại Roshn League Saudi Pro League, thay thế Khalid Al-Atwi, người rời câu lạc bộ theo thỏa thuận đồng thuận sau khi được bổ nhiệm ngày 21 tháng 7. **Dữ kiện chính** - Jamal Sellami, 55 tuổi, từng dẫn dắt đội tuyển Jordan giành vé dự World Cup 2026. - Al-Fateh là câu lạc bộ của vùng Al-Ahsa, không công bố độ dài hợp đồng của Khalid Al-Atwi. - Thương vụ chỉ còn chờ phê duyệt chính thức, theo nhật báo thể thao Arriyadiyah. - Sellami từng là trợ lý đội tuyển quốc gia Morocco năm 2010 và dẫn dắt các đội trẻ U17, U20 Morocco. - Sự nghiệp cầm quân của Sellami gắn với Hassania Agadir, Difaa El Jadidi và Al-Fath Al-Riyadi. **Nguồn** Goal.com, dẫn nhật báo Arriyadiyah | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan** Q: Jamal Sellami là ai? A: Jamal Sellami là huấn luyện viên người Morocco, 55 tuổi, từng dẫn dắt đội tuyển quốc gia Jordan đến World Cup 2026. Q: Al-Fateh đang thi đấu ở giải nào? A: Al-Fateh thi đấu tại Roshn League, giải vô địch quốc gia Saudi Pro League, với tư cách câu lạc bộ tầm trung của vùng Al-Ahsa. Q: Vì sao Khalid Al-Atwi rời Al-Fateh? A: Khalid Al-Atwi rời Al-Fateh theo thỏa thuận đồng thuận sau khi được bổ nhiệm ngày 21 tháng 7, theo Arriyadiyah.
People call me a troublemaker. I call it seeing the run before it happens.
On 21 July, Al-Fateh announced Khalid Al-Atwi as head coach. Before anyone could even learn his face on the touchline, he was gone, via a two-word statement: mutual agreement. By the middle of this month, according to the Saudi sports daily Arriyadiyah, Al-Fateh were exactly one step away from Jamal Sellami — awaiting official approval. One step. But in the Roshn League this season, one step sometimes costs more than an entire season.
I do not care much about that about-to-sign story. What I care about is the paradox behind it: a club that just fired a coach after a few weeks is now waiting on a man who has just taken Jordan to the 2026 World Cup. Those two actions do not come from the same mindset. And when a club acts with two different mindsets in the same month, the problem is not the coach. It is the boardroom.
Place Al-Fateh where they truly belong on the map of the Roshn League. This is the club of Al-Ahsa, an oasis region in the east, far from the commercial axes of Riyadh and Jeddah. In Saudi Arabia this season, Riyadh and Jeddah are where the state pours its money: Al-Hilal, Al-Nassr, Al-Ittihad, Al-Ahli — names that can buy a Champions League star with loose change. Al-Fateh sit in the middle tier, where the budget is not enough to buy a match, only enough to buy a belief.
In that tier, a good coach is the only asset that can be replicated. Star players get pulled away by the big clubs. Academies need ten years to bear fruit. Only the dugout is something Al-Fateh can upgrade immediately — if they choose correctly. And this is where the story starts to smell.
According to Arriyadiyah, Al-Fateh brought Al-Atwi in on 21 July. The same paper notes clearly: the club did not disclose the length of his contract. A club that signs a contract without saying how long it lasts — that is not a small detail. That is a signal. Either the deal was too short to boast about, or the club did not want anyone looking. Both possibilities say one thing: recruitment at Al-Fateh is running on instinct, not on a plan.
Then Al-Atwi left. The statement used the word mutual — meaning both sides agreed to part. In the language of football governance, mutual almost always means: money was paid, and both sides wanted the story buried as fast as possible. Nobody gets sacked for losing a few games. People get a mutual agreement when someone else is already waiting at the door.
And the man waiting at the door is Jamal Sellami.
Here I have to be blunt: the Goal.com report gives me not a single tactical number. No formation, no PPDA, no xG, not one line describing a style of play. If I sat here and declared that Sellami will build a 4-2-3-1 or a high press, I would be inventing it. And inventing is something I do not do, even when it would make my piece louder.
But there is one thing I can read from his record — not tactics, but the shape of a career. And that shape, to me, matters more than any formation.
Sellami is 55. His coaching career follows a very clear path: assistant with the Morocco national team from 2026, then Hassania Agadir, then Al-Fath Al-Riyadi, then Difaa El Jadidi, then Morocco's youth sides at U17 and U20, then back to Difaa El Jadidi in 2026, then Al-Fath Al-Riyadi again, and in 2026 the Jordan national team — where he secured a place at the 2026 World Cup.
To read that path and see only vast experience is a waste. What I see is a specific coaching archetype: a man of systems and short competitions, not a man building a school of play. A coach formed through youth development and a national-team assistant's chair tends to be good at two things — organising people at short notice, and turning a fragmented group into a block that knows how to suffer. That is a qualification-tournament and cup-competition skill. It does not automatically become the skill of a 34-round domestic league.
A national team plays in clusters, with breaks between camps, able to pour everything into three decisive games. A domestic club plays 34 rounds across nine months, with injuries, with a congested calendar, with Tuesday nights away from home. The skill of managing a short tournament does not convert automatically into the skill of managing a long season. They are two different trades, even if both are called coaching.
Based on my experience watching matches across the Gulf leagues, I have noticed a repeating pattern: coaches coming from North African football and from national-team work are often hired by mid-tier clubs for one very specific reason — they know how to stabilise a dressing room in disarray. They are not hired to build beautiful football over three years. They are hired to stop a panic lasting six months.
If you read Al-Fateh through that logic, the story suddenly becomes clearer. The club has just created a power vacuum by pushing Al-Atwi out. In that vacuum, what they need most is not a tactical revolutionary — it is a steady hand who can keep the team from free-falling. Sellami, with his record, is exactly that type. He has just done something similar on a bigger scale: taking an underrated Jordan side and turning it into a World Cup qualifier.
But here is where I want you to stop and ask yourself: if Sellami is that good, why is Al-Fateh — a mid-tier club — his next destination, rather than a bigger team?
The answer is not in his ability. It is in the power structure of Saudi football. A coach who has just taken a national team to a World Cup, in any normal football market, would have at least three offers from top clubs. In Saudi Arabia, top means the four state-backed clubs. And those four do not shop for coaches in the North African market. They shop in Europe, and they pay numbers that leave the rest of the league able only to watch.
So Al-Fateh is not a step up for Sellami. It is the ceiling of a good coach in a league distorted by state money. That is the core paradox of the Roshn League: a competition that can buy every star, but cannot buy a healthy tiering system. Mid-tier clubs like Al-Fateh are forced to pick up good coaches at the exact moment they are at their peak — and to sell them a dream smaller than their own careers.
And here is something few mention: this league is living inside a bubble. When streaming platforms pay to win rights, they repeat the exact mistake of cable television two decades ago — paying more than the product is truly worth. That bubble has not burst, but it is inflating. And when it inflates, the first to be squeezed is not Al-Hilal. It is Al-Fateh.
Now comes the part where I put myself in the position of being contradicted.
There is another reading, and it is not at all foolish: perhaps Al-Fateh are doing everything right. Perhaps Al-Atwi's quick exit was not impatience, but an early detection of a mismatch and the courage to fix it. In football, cutting your losses early is a skill, not a flaw. If Al-Fateh realised Al-Atwi was wrong within weeks and acted decisively, they did something many big clubs never dare to do.
And to be fair: the phrase awaiting official approval, as used by Arriyadiyah, may be nothing more than routine administration. For a Moroccan national taking a job in Saudi Arabia, approval very likely means a work permit and residency paperwork. Everyone has to do it. It is not a sign of a deal about to collapse.
I accept both possibilities. But precisely because I accept them, I feel the need to say out loud something the Saudi media is skating past: when a club does not disclose the contract length of its outgoing coach, and does not specify what official approval actually means, the problem is not a lack of information — the problem is deliberate opacity. That murkiness will not make the deal fail. It only makes evaluating the deal impossible.
In Quang Nam I learned one thing: people hate you for being right a season before them. I once wrote that Quang Nam would be relegated because their squad's average age was nearly thirty, and I was stoned with criticism. At the end of the 2026 season, they went down. The lesson is not that I am clever. The lesson is: when a group acts and nobody understands why, it is usually because they do not understand it themselves. Al-Fateh give me that feeling. They are not hiding information to protect a strategy. They are hiding information because there is no strategy to protect.
Tiki-taka is not dead. It merely exposes the limits of soulless disciples. And in the middle tier of Saudi football, death does not come from a lack of money. It comes from changing coaches like changing shirts — while forgetting that the man in the new shirt is the same man who chose the old one.
So I print my prediction, with a checkpoint, so that three months from now you can come back and interrogate me.
If Jamal Sellami is appointed, I bet that by the end of Round 15 of this Roshn League season, Al-Fateh will not be in the top half of the table. Not because Sellami is weak. But because a good coach cannot fix a club that recruits on instinct. The checkpoint: after Round 15, I will return, open the table, and judge myself in front of you.
And if I am wrong — if Al-Fateh rise and Sellami turns Al-Ahsa into a force — then I will write another piece, admitting that what I called opacity turned out to be a club simply getting on with the work. Football does not need people who are always right. It needs people willing to print what they believe, and then stand there and take the hit.
